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Hanns-Peter Neumann, Monaden im Diskurs. Monas, Monaden, Monadologien (1600 bis 1770). 
Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa, 37. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2013. Pp. 559. Cloth, 
€79.00.
In this rich and detailed study, Hanns-Peter Neumann traces the development of the concept 
of monad from Pythagorean thought as interpreted by philosophers and scholars from the 
early part of the seventeenth century through the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and 
Christian Wolff and concludes with a discussion of late eighteenth-century interpretations 
of various “monadologies.” To contemporary students of the history of philosophy, of 
course, monads are most closely associated with the thought of Leibniz. And for obvious 
reasons: monads are the fundamental beings of the universe in the mature expression of his 
philosophy; his Monadology has become a canonical text in the history of philosophy; and 
most subsequent philosophers who engaged with the philosophy of Leibniz have focused 
on the doctrine of monads. But the story of monads—that is, the history of the concept 
monad—did not begin with Leibniz, nor did it end with him. ‘Monas’ or ‘monad’ was, in 
fact, a relatively common philosophical term throughout the early modern period, which 
is not to say, however, that it had a consistent connotation for all in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Above all, the notion of a simple metaphysical atom that somehow 
grounds all being was considered part and parcel of the thought of the most mysterious 
pre-Socratic figure, Pythagoras. And in eighteenth-century German philosophy especially, 
monads, as the ultimate metaphysical units of being, were on display in the most influential 
textbooks in the philosophical curriculum, that is, principally in the writings of Wolff and 
Alexander Baumgarten. While these philosophers have traditionally been thought to be 
followers of Leibniz, there are many crucial distinctions between them, especially concerning 
the nature of monads. 
As readers of this journal know, there was a great diversity of philosophical views 
among philosophers and thinkers in the early modern period, far greater than might 
be gleaned from the crude presentation of the history of philosophy as being a contest 
between “rationalists” and “empiricists.” While there were many attempts to reject features 
of Scholastic thought, there were also attempts to recover various ancient traditions. The 
Platonist and Neo-Platonist inspirations of the Renaissance did not end there but continued 
into the early modern period as well. And, as Neumann shows in the first part of his 
monograph, Pythagoras was also seen as a powerful source of philosophical inspiration, as 
he was thought to have unified metaphysics, mathematics, physics, cosmology, theology, 
and ethics in a system. Given that no texts of Pythagoras are extant, this meant that the 
ideal was known, the details, less so. But it was thought that Pythagoras advocated some 
kind of system of simple beings, monads, that grounded reality; he was a kind of “religious 
atomist,” as opposed to the “atheist atomist,” Democritus; such is the view advanced by the 
(now) best-known sympathizer of Pythagoras, Ralph Cudworth.
Neumann’s presentation of the early modern uses of Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism by 
Cudworth and others (Johann Christoph Heilbronner, Colin Maclaurin, Gottfried Plouquet) 
is interesting and extremely helpful. Perhaps more worthy of praise, however, is his analysis 
in the weighty second part of the book of the nuances inherent in the systems of Leibniz 
and Wolff and his presentation of the important differences between the two thinkers. 
While both made monads, simple substances, fundamental in their metaphysical systems, 
their conceptions of these monads were quite different. This fact was not always obvious at 
the time, and present-day historians of philosophy often oversimplify the relation between 
Leibniz and Wolff by repeating the old saw that Wolff merely systematized Leibniz’s thought. 
For Leibniz, obviously, all monads were essentially mind-like insofar as they were individuated 
by their representative states. For Wolff, monads were not essentially representative; they 
were essentially active forces. Now, for Leibniz, the representational activity and forces of 
simple substances amounted to the same thing, and it is for this reason that his thought is 
closer to the idealized version of Pythagoras. Even a so-called Wolffian, Andreas Clavius, 
calls Leibniz “the German Pythagoras redivivus.” This second part of the work concludes with 
two interesting, shorter chapters: one dealing with eighteenth-century interpretations of 
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Leibniz’s Monadology by Michael Gottlieb Hansch, Johann Jakob Brucker, and Louis Dutens; 
the other containing a fascinating account of Andreas Clavius and his heretofore forgotten 
entry, Monadologiae Sciographia, in the Berlin Academy essay competition of 1747 on the 
nature of monads (thankfully transcribed and contained in the appendix).
Neumann’s story is also helpful insofar as he picks up on the social and political features 
of the Leibniz-Wolff relationship—that is, how each sought to place himself in the Republic 
of Letters and in the German and European cultural milieu. Indeed, Neumann makes this 
point even more general: Pythagoras, first, and then the Leibnizian monadology, were 
instrumentalized by different thinkers. The importance of this argument is that it lifts the 
history of the concept of the monad from the realm of pure philosophical dialectic and 
situates it also in its human and historical setting.
B r a n d o n  C .  L o o k
University of Kentucky
Sébastien Charles and Plínio J. Smith, editors. Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlighten-
ment, Lumières, Aufklärung. International Archives of the History of Ideas, 210. Dor-
drecht: Springer, 2013. Pp. xxvii + 381. Cloth, $129.00.
This volume is another instance of the enduring influence of Richard Popkin’s pioneering 
work on the history of modern skepticism. Moreover, although he initially maintained that 
skepticism had a negligible impact on eighteenth-century philosophy, he eventually came 
to adopt the opposite view. The aim of the collection is to show that skepticism played a 
more important role in the eighteenth century than is usually thought, either because a 
number of thinkers adopted a skeptical stance or because the main rationalist systems must 
be regarded as responses to skeptical challenges. For this reason, the editors (i) criticize 
Popkin’s early judgment and those who still accept it, and (ii) remark repeatedly that the real 
impact of skepticism on the eighteenth century has begun to be appreciated only recently. 
Nevertheless, in chapter 1, in which he discusses Popkin’s successive views on the influence 
of skepticism in the Enlightenment, Charles claims that Popkin was mistaken in changing 
his mind and coming to view the Enlightenment as a skeptical era highly preoccupied with 
a mitigated form of skepticism. And (ii) is a bit of an exaggeration: suffice it to consider 
the several works by, for example, Keith Baker, Daniel Breazale, Ezequiel de Olaso, Robert 
Fogelin, Michael Forster, Giorgio Tonelli, and even Popkin published in the 1970s–90s 
and cited by the editors themselves. This is not to deny that this volume will broaden our 
knowledge and deepen our understanding of its topic.
The book consists of five parts in twenty-three chapters, eighteen in English, five 
in French. Although each has a bibliography, the volume includes a global one. It also 
contains an index nominum, but no index rerum. Two positive features are the international 
provenance of its contributors and that both major and minor figures are discussed. There 
are a number of typos and infelicities of style. As often happens, the contributions are not 
of equal value or equally stimulating, but the volume as a whole is a welcome addition to 
the literature on modern skepticism. Since a reviewer must be selective, I will limit myself 
to providing an overview of the volume and describing some of the chapters.
Part 1 explores the presence of skepticism in the early eighteenth century. Smith 
examines Pierre Bayle’s skeptical method of antinomy as displayed in his Dictionary, 
contrasting it with that of Sextus Empiricus. Smith makes no mention of secondary literature 
except for a paper of his, which is unfortunate given the considerable number of valuable 
recent works dealing with Sextus’s Pyrrhonism and with Bayle’s not always clear stance on 
skepticism. Anton Matytsin’s chapter analyzes the responses to Bayle’s Pyrrhonism by Jean-
Pierre de Crousaz and David-Renaud Boullier. 
Parts 2–4 address the influence of skepticism on, respectively, British, French, and 
German philosophy. Part 2 opens with Peter Kail’s succinct analysis of the connection 
between moral skepticism and the moral sense theories of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. 
